25 May 2007
Gordon Brown has said he is not opposed to electoral reform if it keeps the constituency link. One idea is the alternative vote system, which is supported by ministers Gareth Thomas and James Plaskitt. They explain the advantages
For the sake of Britain's democratic health, it needs to reverse the decline in the level of trust in politicians and the political process that we have seen over the past two decades. This decline has many causes, each of which needs a response, but an essential step is to change the way our elections are organised. Otherwise, the current system, and the politics it produces, will continue to leave many electors both disengaged and distrustful.
In theory, elections are fought across every constituency in the UK. In reality, some seats have never been held by more than one political party since they were created and are unlikely to change allegiance in any but the most exceptional circumstances. Hence, modern elections are fought hard across only a relative handful of seats – the 'marginals'. This is where parties concentrate their effort, their money and the time of their big names. It is also where the Dimblebys, Snows and Paxmans concentrate their attention.
In the non-marginals – except when there are particular local circumstances – most elections entail less frenzied campaigns. The incentives for political parties to engage more regularly with electors in every seat across the whole of Britain are simply not in place. The result in many places is lower engagement and lower turnout. For example, turnout in Monmouth, with a majority of just 384 votes, or 0.9%, in the 2005 general election was 73.4%, some 12% above the UK average. Meanwhile, in Liverpool Riverside, a seat with a significant majority of over 10,000, turnout was just 41.4%, almost 20% lower than the national average, with less than half the eligible electorate bothering to cast their vote.
The 2006 Power Inquiry noted that if people believe their vote will count, they will turn out, but if they believe their vote does not matter or that they won't be heard, they won't bother. Our current electoral system (first past the post) embeds the problem. Too many electors feel their vote has been wasted if they don't back the winning candidate or that their vote is unlikely to make any difference to the overall outcome.
The current system also shapes campaign strategies. These reinforce the problem. For politicians and political parties wanting to get re-elected at present, the incentives lie with identifying their supporters and trying to maximise the turnout of those they know are likely to vote for them.
Similarly, in the vast majority of seats where one of the major parties is clearly in third place, the parties placed first and second will often run 'squeeze'
campaigns, encouraging supporters of the third-placed party to vote tactically to keep out their least preferred party. This further distorts results by asking voters to go against their first instincts.
Admittedly, many politicians and candidates do try to break out of these systemic constraints. But if we want to increase trust and re-excite cynics we need to recast the electoral system so that all candidates have incentives to engage with every voter.
The one method of electoral reform that would retain the strengths of our current system but create incentives for candidates to engage with every voter is the alternative vote system. Various forms of AV are used for key elections in Australia, Ireland, Malta, France and even the United States.
AV retains the link between an MP and a constituency but unlike first past the post it enables the elector to vote for candidates in order of preference. Candidates could not therefore just concentrate on their own supporters, they would also have to connect with all voters to win second and third preferences. A key benefit of AV is that, unlike under first past the post, candidates require the support of more than 50% of those voting.
Indeed, under AV, electors would have increased motivation to engage with politicians and their ideas because every vote in every seat would matter much more. In elections to the House of Representatives in Australia, almost half of all seats in recent elections have been determined by the distribution of preferences.
To be successful, candidates would have to reach out to those who previously haven't voted, or haven't voted for them, to win those potentially crucial second and third preference votes. They would also have to engage with all their electors all year round (as some do now) to develop and maintain the relationships of trust necessary to win. Some contests would still be more predictable than others but there would be far less inevitability. This would result in both wider and deeper dialogue between candidates and voters.
AV also offers an opportunity for the vast majority of politicians, and indeed voters, in the political mainstream, who are battling the apparent increasing rise in support for extremist parties such as the British National Party. While the BNP has made gains under first past the post, these have often been by small majorities over a split vote for the main parties and on low turnouts: in Burnley in 2006, two BNP councillors were elected with a combined majority of just 119 votes over their nearest opponents, on a turnout averaging less than 40% in those two wards.
However, under AV it is highly unlikely that the second or even third preferences of Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat voters would transfer to the BNP, exposing their real level of electoral support and thus denying them the representation that such a lack of support should have reflected in our town halls.
Opponents of electoral reform, especially of systems where voters list candidates (or parties) by preference, often argue that such systems are overly complicated and would confuse voters, pushing down turnouts and distorting results. But this is not borne out in the experience of other countries. In Germany, for example, turnout at the general election in 2005 was 77.7%, compared with 61.4% in the UK. Indeed, given the lamentable turnouts in recent UK elections using first past the post, the suggestion that its simplicity and certainty of results encourages voters to turn out is highly questionable.
The government already invests heavily, via the Electoral Commission, in campaigns of voter education and engagement, an estimated £26m for 2007/08. There is no reason to doubt the effectiveness of the commission in coming up with materials to inform voters how to cast a vote in an AV election, as it already has experience of dealing with new or changed electoral systems for the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, European Parliament and now Scottish local government.
It is also argued that electoral reform inevitably leads to coalition governments and thus instability. However, first past the post is no guarantee against either hung parliaments, as witnessed in 1974, or governments with an overall Commons majority suffering from instability, as John Major found. But the workings of AV make hung parliaments no more likely than first past the post, while offering the advantages outlined.
Electoral reform is not a magic bullet to solve the decline in trust. Other solutions are needed, too. Changes to party funding rules, House of Lords reform and citizenship lessons in schools are all vital. The alternative vote method of elections does, however, offer new incentives to encourage change in politicians' behaviour both between and during elections. That could help rebuild some of the lost trust.
Gareth Thomas and James Plaskitt are ministers in, respectively, the international development and work & pensions departments
PFmay2007
