The Ministry of Defence is obviously not immune from the culture of austerity, but recent reforms to the armed forces make little strategic sense and look more and more like a flawed budget-cutting exercise
In the last few days we have seen a number of stories concerning the future configuration of our armed forces and the performance of the Ministry of Defence.
Most recently, MPs on the Commons Defence Committee have accused the MoD of making a ‘rushed and flawed’ decision concerning fighter aircraft for the Royal Navy's planned new aircraft carriers.
They highlighted the costly flip-flopping over whether to opt for carrier landing aircraft or jump jets. Eventually, jump jets were selected despite the fact that carrier landing aircraft are cheaper, have a longer range and carry more weapons.
Meanwhile, four decommissioned Type 22 frigates, HMS Cumberland, HMS Campbeltown, HMS Chatham and HMS Cornwall are currently moored in Portsmouth Harbour awaiting buyers. It appears that no proposals to preserve the ships have been submitted, but there are bids to either recycle them or turn some of them into artificial reefs.
This comes just a few months after General Sir David Richards, the UK Chief of Defence Staff, told an invited audience that one of his main worries was the lack of Royal Navy destroyers and frigates.
And, of course, in January the MoD announced plans to cut a further 5,300 posts as part of the coalition’s defence cuts. This is the third ‘tranche’ of Army sackings, which will cut the regular Army from 102,000 posts to around 82,000. This will be the smallest army since the Napoleonic wars.
Now let’s be clear about this. All of us who read and write on the Public Finance website fully understand the nature of and need for financial austerity. We also understand the budgetary pressures being faced by the MoD, even though some of these pressures are the consequence of poor decision-making in the past.
As finance professionals, we emphasise the importance of good financial analysis and decision making although some of us wonder how effective the analysis of public policy options in Whitehall really is.
Finally, we also recognise that decisions about public services have to take account of a wide range of strategic and operational issues as well as the financials.
But it is not clear that this is what is happening in the MoD, and it does look more and more like a cost-cutting exercise with little strategic direction.
If we look across the globe we see a huge number of strategic challenges that may impact on the UK’s armed forces:
- The aftermath and legacy of the war in Afghanistan after withdrawal in 2014
- The future of UK military involvement in North Africa, limited at present but which may result in mission creep
- The instability in the Middle East and the potential future impact on oil supplies and shipping through the Suez Canal
- The potential for conflict between China and Japan over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands, which may drag the USA and other Nato countries into any conflict
- The nuclear threats from Iran
- Given the anaemic state of the global economy, the potential for trade wars and the possible need for a military response
- The wish for the UK government (although perhaps not the population) to intervene in conflicts in other countries
It could be argued that defence of the realm is the primary public service that goes back centuries. But it does not seem that defence needs are the priority for the MoD as it undertakes what looks increasingly like a budget-cutting exercise.
