It's too easy to take a rosy view of what the Olympics cost the taxpayer. Next week's Public Accounts Committee needs to ask some tough questions
Since Danny Boyle became a secular saint for his spectacular Olympics opening ceremony - and the subsequent games were so productive (in British medals) and so much enjoyed at home and abroad - criticism now could sound churlish.
Even the auditors have become happy clappy. The latest National Audit Office review of the Olympic Delivery Authority is unusually warm, and next week’s interrogation of officials by the Commons Public Accounts Committee will at least start upbeat.
Margaret Hodge and her colleagues will probably have a go at the hapless Nick Buckles of G4S, inviting him to see his firm’s loss of the contract for HM Prison Wolds as a consequence of its lamentable performance on games security.
The PAC takes the unfashionable line that government should be joined up and if a contractor fails in one sector, Whitehall should use that as evidence to judge its potential performance elsewhere.
(In parallel, Mrs Hodge reckons it's questionable whether companies that give firms tips on how to park UK-generated revenue in tax havens should be given contracts to advise Whitehall or audit councils.)
However, as games euphoria evaporates, old questions about cost effectiveness return. From the depths of today’s austerity we look back on the generosity of the original funding, padded by contingency cash and off-the-books contributions by the NHS, Transport for London and other public bodies. On that basis, was it such a feat to bring the thing in under budget?
The PAC might ask for an overall balance sheet. Perhaps Jonathan Stephens, permanent secretary at the Department for Culture, Media and Sport could draft one, making sure it computes the unpaid for benefits to the private sector, the knock-on costs of the security fiasco plus the benefits (if any) of increased public participation in sport and the alleged feel-good boost to GDP growth in the second and third quarters of 2012.
Stephens may well say that’s not for him, it’s the Treasury’s job. Unfortunately both the delivery of the games and their aftermath expose for the umpteenth time the fragmented nature of Whitehall and the absence of any strategic centre. Let’s not pretend the central departments, the Treasury and the Cabinet Office, let alone Number Ten are really in control.
This matters, especially when we ask about legacy. If the NAO’s rosy judgement about the performance of the Olympic Delivery Authority is right, it offers compelling lessons about project management: there may even be people who could transfer the skills they have acquired. (The infrastructure boost promised in the Autumn Statement will demand savvy management.)
But who is going to ensure such expertise is made available? The PAC will surely ask why oversight of ‘legacy’ is now switching to the Cabinet Office, which has hitherto had no part in the Olympics project.
One part of the public sector has gained valuable experience from constructing the site and making the games happen (and there’s plenty more to be gleaned from the way the site is put to alternative use). But who will now distil the lessons, let alone make them more broadly available to local as well as central government?
