28 March 2008
Critics of George Bush have accused him of many things, from trampling on civil liberties to playing the dictator, but greatly reduced powers actually mean the presidency is more constrained than ever before
Most of the coverage of the US elections has concentrated on who is going to win — there has been very little coverage of what they are going to win. What powers will the forty-fourth president inherit?
The conventional wisdom is that President George Bush and his supporters have tried to create an 'imperial' presidency, a term originally coined by Arthur Schlesinger to describe the Nixon White House.
According to this view, Bush has unbalanced the fundamental settlement in the US constitution, overriding congressional and judicial constraints, and is even accused of having 'stolen' the election from Al Gore in 2000. Bush is variously accused of trampling on civil liberties, assuming semi-dictatorial powers and centralising power in the White House.
A new book by Maxwell School scholar Al Roberts — The collapse of fortress Bush — systematically demolishes this view. Far from inheriting a new imperial presidency, John McCain, Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton will take over an enfeebled White House with worryingly little ability to steer the most powerful nation on the planet.
Roberts argues that many of the accusations levelled against the Bush presidency have been greatly exaggerated. Take civil liberties, which, notwithstanding Guantanamo and other infringements of rights, were subject to much greater curtailment under emergency powers during the Second World War, the McCarthy witch hunts and the Vietnam War.
Roberts is not out to exonerate Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and the other neo-cons but to demonstrate that the presidency is weakened and growing more so.
Again and again, Congress, the courts and successful civil society actions have thwarted presidential moves to erode the rights of US citizens. To be sure, there have been some encroachments but they have been relatively small.
Roberts suggests there have been multiple constraints on the imperial ambitions of Bush and his cronies. The first is increasing institutional complexity. The executive side of the US government (the bit the president controls) is far more complex than it was 30 years ago. This makes it far more difficult to steer.
Another element has been the controls introduced after the Nixon era, including a whole swathe of legislation, plus watchdog agencies and non-governmental organisations.
The context of government has also changed — markets have become more complex and powerful, with the recent lack of control that the president and the Federal Reserve had over the sub-prime mortgage crisis being an obvious case in point.
Information technology changes have made government more transparent, more leaky and subject to much greater instantaneous scrutiny. Pictures of soldiers dying in Vietnam usually emerged long after the event — in Iraq we have had 'real-time' reporting.
Ironically, the neo-liberal policies espoused by Bush and his Republican supporters have also undermined the presidency. By trying to limit federal spending, deregulating and systematically undermining the public domain, they have also undermined the powers of the executive. Cavalier deregulation of financial institutions and big business — from WorldCom and Enron to sub-prime mortgages and Bear Stearns — have led to numerous crises.
Finally, there has been a decline in trust and fidelity within government. Even presidential appointees have been less loyal to their patron than in previous times. In the wider military and civil services, both legitimate and illegitimate whistle-blowing has reached epic proportions. Roberts points out that 'Deep Throat' — Mark Felt — waited 30 years before admitting his role in exposing Watergate. Today, whistle-blowers are more likely to rush into print and cash in within months.
Roberts' book reminds us of a fundamental truth about modern democracies — governments and their opponents often have a vested interest in exaggerating the degree to which rhetoric has been transformed into reality. Instead, we should always be asking, what has really changed? And how does it compare to what has happened before?
Such realism is all too infrequent in much of what passes for political analysis these days. A President McCain or Obama, but perhaps less so a President Clinton, who's been there before, will find out just how true this is next January.
There are lessons here also for those who tend to exaggerate how far we have a 'presidential' style of government in the UK. Reality is almost always more complex. Government is not all-powerful. Ask Alistair Darling or Gordon Brown if they think they are in control of the financial crisis. If they were honest they'd say no, or at least, not a lot.
Colin Talbot is professor of public policy and management
PFmar2008
